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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 370 
Accident time: 11:45 Accident Date: 27/09/2001 
Where it occurred: Kurvala region, 
Albania/Kosovo border
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 09/10/2001 
ID original source: BOI: No 015/2001 Name of source: KMACC/TKG 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 21/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: DN 2944 0742 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: GR 34T Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
What follows is the report of a Board of Inquiry investigation made available in January 2002. 
The report has been edited for anonymity. 
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 015/2001 
Introduction 
1)  In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Center (MACC) Standard Working 
Procedure No 4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Thursday 27 
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September 2001 for an Accident Investigation Board of Inquiry.  Annex A details the 
Convening Order. 
2)  This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the mine accident that 
occurred on Thursday 27 September 2001.  Based on the investigation, interviews, 
statements from the Demining group personnel involved in the accident, visits and photos of 
the accident site, this accident is considered preventable. 
3)  This finding is based on the fact that at the time of the accident the Victim was conducting 
prodding drills in order to investigate a reading from his metal detector.  At the time of 
detonation he was in the kneeling position prodding into an uphill slope.  Whilst in this position 
the angle of prodding would have been increased to an angle closer to 90 degrees instead of 
the 30 degree angle as stated in the MACC Guidelines and Technical Standards. 
4)  The accident occurred at minefield number 431, Task Dossier number W01-43, GR 34T 
DN 2944 0742 on 27 September 2001 at 11:45 hours. 
Events leading up to the Accident 
5)  The Demining group team callsign 13M have been conducting manual clearance in the 
Kurvala region along the Albanian border for the past three weeks and have been living on 
site in a field camp.  The location is very remote and mountainous and requires a 40-minute 
walk up to the site from the nearest road.  There are four minefields within the Task Dossier 
W01-43.  The minefield number 431 contains PMR2A fragmentation mines with PMA3 blast 
mines as keepers.  Within the vicinity of the accident site approximately 40 PMA3 blast mines 
and three PMR2A fragmentation mines have been removed and destroyed. 
6)  Due to the previous mine accident two days before, minefield 431 was not operational the 
day prior to this accident. Therefore this was the first day of clearance at this minefield since 
the accident on 25 Sep 01.  On the day of the accident at approximately 11:45hrs, the Victim 
was commencing a clearance lane up the side of a hill.  He was investigating a reading from 
his metal detector by prodding, and was in the kneeling position at the time.  Whilst prodding 
he detonated a PMA3 anti-personnel blast mine.  The resulting blast covered the inside of his 
protective visor with dirt and dust and caused injury to both eyes.  He suffered no injury to his 
hands.  The message passed to the MACC during the time of the accident was that he was 
unconscious throughout the CASEVAC.  This was later proven to be false, as he was 
conscious the whole time. 
7)  The Victim was working on a slope and the initial blast caused him to fall backwards and 
roll a little way down the hill.  The team leader witnessed the explosion and then assisted the 
Victim to the rest area where they then awaited the arrival of the team medic.  [The control 
group] was notified of the accident and a helicopter CASEVAC was requested. When the 
medic arrived he applied first aid treatment to his eyes.  He was then assisted to the 
helicopter winch area by the medic and the remainder of the team and awaited the arrival of 
the CASEVAC helicopter.  There were no time delays and confusion with this CASEVAC as 
there was with the previous mine accident at this site.  When the helicopter landed the 
German doctor on board assessed the injuries.  It was apparent there was damage to both 
eyes and it was then decided to take the casualty directly to the Russian Hospital in Pristina.  
The Russian Hospital has an eye specialist that is able to best give treatment. 
8)  It is a possible that the angle of the prodder when the Victim was investigating the detector 
reading was not at 30 degrees.  Given that he was prodding up hill into a slope in the kneeling 
position meant that the angle of his prodder to the ground would have more likely been at an 
angle greater than 30 degrees and probably nearer 90 degrees.  Another possibility is that 
mine may have been face onto him and therefore detonated when he prodded into it. 
 
9)  An on scene investigation of the accident site revealed that the inside the Victim’s 
protective visor was covered in dust and dirt from the blast.  The outside of his visor was 
clean and did not have any such evidence. This obviously indicates that the blast from the 
explosion was directed up under the visor and into the eyes.  In order for this to occur, the 
visor could not have been worn correctly coupled with the fact he was in the kneeling position 
and above the blast. If the Victim was in the prone position whilst prodding, the angle of the 
prodder would tend to be more naturally at the correct angle.  If there did happen to be an 
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uncontrolled explosion whilst prodding in the prone position the blast would not have been 
directed under his visor. 
 
The picture above shows the accident site on a hillside. 
The picture below shows the victim’s right glove and prodder. 
 
There is no damage to the prodder or to the right glove.  The Victim did not suffer any injuries 
to his hands. 
 
Work History of the Casualty 
10)  The Victim has been with the Demining group since 1996, and commenced working in 
Kosovo 13 June 2001. 
Past History of the Area 
11)  The accident site is Task Dossier W01-43, at minefield number 431.  The minefields in 
this task dossier are all in the Kurvala Mountain Range and were laid by the VJ Army along 
the Kosovo – Albanian Border.  There are a number of minefields along the border with 
Albania and the majority have a high density of mines.  The minefields contain both anti-
personnel fragmentation and blast mines. 
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
12)  The Task Dossier No W01-43 was issued to the Demining group on 3 September 2001.  
There are four minefields detailed in this dossier, 418, 431, 434 and 436.  Minefields 434 and 
418 have been completed and work continues on 436, with 431 yet to be started. 
 
Geography and Weather 
13)  The Kurvala region is situated in the West of Kosovo along the Albanian border and 
approximately 5Km South East of the Montenegrin border.  It is a remote mountainous area 
with heights exceeding 2600m in places.  The height of this minefield is at 2300m.  Access to 
these minefields is either by foot or helicopter with no vehicle access.  The nearest road is a 
40 minute walk.  The local populous from both Kosovo and Albania use these high plateaus 
for summer grazing of their livestock.  The weather at the time of the accident was slightly 
overcast with variable winds and a temperature of approximately 15 degrees Celsius. 
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 Site Layout and Marking 
14)  The site layout and marking at the site was in accordance with the Demining group’s 
SOPs for mine clearance. According to the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ) minefield record, there are 
three mine rows containing PMR2A fragmentation mines with PMA3 blast mines as keepers. 
 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
15)  The Demining group is a commercial mine clearance company that employs 
Zimbabwean Deminers, Team Leaders and Operations Officers.  As such there is no local 
demining capability within the company in Kosovo.  The Operations Officer has operational 
responsibility for the Demining group demining teams, with the team leaders directly 
responsible for the day to day supervision on site of their respective teams.  Each of the 
Demining group’s demining team consists of a Team Leader, four manual deminers and a 
team medic. 
 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
16)  The Demining group Internal Quality Control (QC) is achieved through a system of on-
site checks by the Team Leader to ensure adherence to the mine clearance SOPs.  The 
normal procedure for QC is for the team leader to conduct a 10% check of the clearance 
lanes using the same detector that the deminer used for the clearance.  The MACC QA teams 
conduct external Quality Assurance on a regular basis, normally each site is visited a 
minimum of once per week.  An external QA inspection had been conducted two days prior to 
the accident by a MACC QA team.  Prior to this a number of visits by the MACC COO, Ops 
Offr and QA Offr had been conducted to this site on a regular basis. 
 
Communications and Reporting 
17)  At the time of the accident there was effective communication by VHF hand-held 
Motorola radios between the team site and call sign 56 (the Demining group Gjakova) on the 
Kosovo wide net as well as the team site and [another group] on the MNB(S) net.  This team 
site also has effective HF communications to all of the other [Demining group] call signs 
operating in Kosovo. 
18)  The initial notification was reported to the MACC on the Kosovo wide net within five 
minutes of the accident.  This report was received from call sign 56 (The Demining group 
Gjakova).  However the message received was that The Victim was unconscious throughout 
the entire CASEVAC.  This transpired to be false.  At no stage did he lose consciousness. 
 
Medical Details 
19)  The initial injuries that [the Victim] suffered were dirt and dust in both eyes with no other 
apparent injuries.  He was taken to the Russian Hospital in Pristina for treatment and has 
since been transferred to the German Hospital in Prizren.  It has now become apparent that 
he has also suffered some damage to the hearing in his right ear. 
 
Personnel 
20)  Written statements from the Demining group personnel involved in the accident are at 
Annex E. [Not made available.] 
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Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
21)  At the time of the accident the Victim was wearing personal protective equipment.  
However due to the injury to his eyes and the dirt and dust inside his protective visor, it is 
clear that it was not worn correctly. 
 
Tools and Equipment  
22)  The Victim was investigating a reading from his metal detector with his prodder at the 
time of detonation.  There was no damage to either his detector or prodder. 
 
Details of Mine Involved 
23)  [An illustration of a PMA-3, including disarming instructions was included.] 
 
Account of Activities 
24)  The following is a description of the events from the time of the accident until the casualty 
was at the hospital: 
Thursday 27 September 2001 
11:45hrs – Uncontrolled detonation at minefield number 431 involving the Victim. 
11:46hrs – [Control group] and callsign 56 (the Demining group) notified of the accident and 
CASEVAC helicopter requested. 
11:50hrs – MACC notified of the accident. 
11:55hrs – Casualty taken to helicopter winch area. 
12:25hrs – CASEVAC helicopter arrives at winch area and German doctor gives further 
treatment. 
13:00hrs – Helicopter departs with casualty for Russian KFOR hospital in Pristina. 
Friday 28 September 2001 
11:00hrs – MACC QA Officer and the Demining group’s Programme Manager (ITF Contract) 
conduct scene examination of accident site. 
 
Insurance Details 
25)  All The Demining group staff involved in mine clearance activities in Kosovo are covered 
by the standard Demining group insurance through Lloyds of London. 
 
Conclusions 
26)  Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
There was an uncontrolled detonation of a PMA3 anti-personnel mine on Thursday 27 
September 2001 in [the Demining group’s] minefield number 431 situated in the Kurvala 
region of Kosovo.  The Victim was investigating a reading from his metal detector and has 
then detonated the mine with his prodder. 
As a result of the uncontrolled detonation deminer The Victim suffered injury to both eyes as 
well as damage to the hearing in his right ear. 
It is apparent from the injury to the eyes and the dirt and dust inside the face of the visor that 
The Victim was not wearing his visor correctly. 
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It is highly likely that given the steepness of the slope the Victim was working on, the angle of 
the prodder would have been greater than 30 degrees to the ground.  It is the view of the 
board that this was the major contributing cause of the uncontrolled detonation. 
As a result of the explosion the Victim fell backwards and rolled a short distance down the hill.  
This obviously is a danger when working in a mined area.  If he were in the prone position this 
likely would not have occurred. 
The position of the mine involved in the accident was part of a clear and obvious mine row, 
and was also consistent with the regular spacing of the mines.  This mine should therefore not 
have been unexpected, and with correct drills and due care should have been identified and 
removed safely. 
Receiving notification of the mine accident in the MACC HQ in very short time is laudable, 
although as it turned out the casualty was not unconscious at anytime during the CASEVAC 
as was reported by the Demining group.  The information given needs to be accurate as it 
could lead to unnecessary actions and further complicate and confuse the procedure. 
 
Recommendations 
27)  The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
The Demining group amend their SOPs to state that when conducting prodding on a slope, all 
deminers must carry this out in the prone position, and ensure that the angle of the prodder 
remains at 30 degrees to the ground at all times. 
The correct wearing of personal protective equipment is to be strictly enforced by the 
Demining group management and supervisory staff. 
The Demining group management and supervisory staff are to re-emphasis to their deminers 
the need to maintain concentration and due care whilst conducting manual clearance drills.  
The Demining group team leaders are to be extra vigilant to ensure their deminers are 
conducting their clearance drills effectively and safely. 
The Demining group team leaders are to ensure deminers are made aware of identified 
patterns of mine rows and that necessary precautions and care is taken. 
The Demining group is to ensure the correct information is given when reporting mine 
accidents or incidents. 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre 
Quality Assurance Officer 
 
Annexes: [not made available] 
A. MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry. 
B. Map of the general area. 
Schematic diagram of the general accident area. 
IMSMA Mine Accident Report. 
Witness Statements. 
Medical report from the MACC QA Officer. 
The Demining group Internal Report 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 474 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available 
(insured) 
Time to hospital: More than 1 hour 15 
minutes 
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Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hearing 
severe Eyes 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of the accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it is possible that the 
deminer was working according to authorised SOPs when the accident occurred. The 
investigator thought it likely that he was prodding too steeply because he was on a slope and 
kneeling. If this is true and the deminer was following SOPs, those SOPs may have been 
inappropriate. If this was the case, the levels of management that devised and approved the 
SOPs may have been at fault.  
The fact that the deminer’s prodding tool, glove and hand were not damaged in the blast 
imply that they were not directly over the mine as they would have been if he was prodding 
too steeply. 
Whatever the facts about the prodding angle, the fact that the deminer was allowed to work 
with his visor raised was a “Field control inadequacy”, so the secondary cause is listed as 
that. 
 
Related papers 
Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer 
[This accident is mentioned in a report accompanying the Inquiry into another accident with 
this demining group three days later. This Accident is “B” below.] 
Reference: 
• Accident Report, 25 Sep 01 
• Accident Report, 27 Sep 01 
• Accident Report, 30 Sep 01 
 
Three separate mine clearance accidents occurred over a 5 day period in the same minefield 
and involving the same mine clearance team. Whilst the technical cause of each accident is 
different and is addressed in three separate Mine Accident Investigation Reports, they are all 
inter-linked with the underlying origins of increased hazard, due to density and location of 
minefield, and subsequent requirement for more vigilant supervision and pro-active 
management support. Therefore, for ease of reference and objective conclusions, they will all 
be grouped together and commented on below. 
1)  The first accident, as detailed at Reference A, may be clearly attributed to a lack of  
attention on the part of Deminer [name excised]. He had either failed to detect a PMA-3 and 
unknowingly moved his base stick close to or on top of it, or he was so distracted by the 
proximity of the PMR-2 that he inadvertently moved his base stick further forward than 
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normal. This in a confined area that a significant number of mines had already been located 
in. 
2)  The initial Medevac request was for the wrong location and the resulting confusion and 
time delays may have proved critical if the casualty had sustained a more serious injury. 
3)  This accident should have indicated a definite requirement for closer management 
supervision of this technically difficult and remote site. 
4)  The second accident, as detailed at Reference B, following on as it did from the first, 
should not have been allowed to cause such an injury. If the injured deminer,  [name excised], 
had been paying the necessary attention to detail, wearing his visor correctly and adopting 
the prone position whilst prodding onto a probable PMA-3 mine, it is likely that, should the 
accident still have occurred, he would have sustained only slight injuries as he would have 
been offered the full protection of his facial PPE. 
5)  The fact that he was not should have, again, highlighted an urgent requirement to review 
the supervisory and management oversight of this remote and technically difficult site. 
Additionally, once again, incorrect and critical information was passed during the Medevac 
request.  
6)  The third accident, detailed at Reference C, is clearly attributable to negligence on the part 
of deminer [name excised]. At the time of writing, at least another two PMA-3 mines have 
been located in adjacent cleared areas and this conclusively underlines the lack of close 
supervision and management support required to operate at this location. 
7)  The demining group] have built a reputation, in Kosovo, based on professional 
competency, operational effectiveness and the sheer hard work of their deminers. This 
reputation is fully justified and endorsed by the MACC; it was for precisely this reason that 
[the demining group] were selected to work on this demanding site. These accidents, coming 
as they do at the end of a long two years of sustained operations and nearly 4000 mines 
safely found and destroyed, should not detract from the credit due to the [Demining group] 
deminers or [the demining group] as an organisation. Rather they should serve as an 
unfortunate reminder of the constant need to remain vigilant and to sustain supervisory and 
management oversight during this final, intense, stage of the mine clearance programme in 
Kosovo. 
The Conclusions of the Board of Inquiry are fully concurred with. The Recommendations are 
also endorsed and are to be implemented immediately. Whilst future accidents may be a 
probability, one attributed to the same, or similar, causes is unacceptable.  
 
Related papers 2 
As a result of the accidents involving this demining group, the MACC issued combined 
conclusions of those accidents as a separate paper stressing the need for improved site 
management. 
 
ACCIDENT 25 SEP 01 
Conclusions 
Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
There was an uncontrolled detonation of a PMA3 anti-personnel mine on Tuesday 25 
September 2001 in [the Demining group] minefield number 431 situated in the Kurvala region 
of Kosovo.  It appears [the Victim] inadvertently placed the outside of his left foot on the mine 
as he was turning to take up his metal detector.  
Deminer [the Victim] initially suffered deep lacerations and broken bones to his left foot as a 
result of the uncontrolled detonation. He has since had two toes of his left foot amputated by 
the German KFOR doctors in Prizren.  
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Initial confusion and time delays resulted from relaying the CASEVAC information from the 
accident site to [name excised] through callsign 56 (Demining group Gjakova), despite 
effective communications from the accident site directly to [name excised].  This confusion 
was compounded when the first grid reference given was to callsign 56B1 location instead of 
13M.   
The exact position of the base stick in relation to the uncontrolled detonation can not be 
determined as it was destroyed in the blast.  However the fact that it was destroyed indicates 
that it must have been in very close proximity to the explosion. 
A PMR2A was visible 70cm past the blast hole.  This may have been a distraction to [the 
victim] as he was clearing toward it.  It appears he has not concentrated and taken due care 
whilst conducting his manual clearance drill. 
The German KFOR CASEVAC helicopter crew displayed exceptional flying ability to land the 
aircraft in adverse conditions. 
 
Recommendations 
The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
The [Demining group] teams in the Kurvala region that are supported by German KFOR 
CASEVAC helicopters are to establish and maintain direct radio communications with [name 
excised] on an hourly basis during operations, and are to communicate directly with [name 
excised] for helicopter CASEVACs. 
[The Demining group’s] management and supervisory staff are to re-emphasis to their 
deminers the need to maintain concentration and focus whilst conducting manual clearance 
drills. [The Demining group] team leaders are to be extra vigilant to ensure their deminers are 
conducting their clearance drills effectively and safely. 
The German KFOR be commended for their CASEVAC and medical support in difficult 
conditions. 
 
ACCIDENT 27 SEP 01 
Conclusions 
Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
There was an uncontrolled detonation of a PMA3 anti-personnel mine on Thursday 27 
September 2001 in [the Demining group] minefield number 431 situated in the Kurvala region 
of Kosovo. [The Victim] was investigating a reading from his metal detector and has then 
detonated the mine with his prodder. 
As a result of the uncontrolled detonation deminer [the Victim] suffered injury to both eyes as 
well as damage to the hearing in his right ear. 
It is apparent from the injury to the eyes and the dirt and dust inside the face of the visor that 
[the Victim] was not wearing his visor correctly. 
It is highly likely that given the steepness of the slope [the Victim] was working on, the angle 
of the prodder would have been greater than 30 degrees to the ground.  It is the view of the 
board that this was the major contributing cause of the uncontrolled detonation. 
As a result of the explosion [the Victim] fell backwards and rolled a short distance down the 
hill.  This obviously is a danger when working in a mined area.  If he were in the prone 
position this likely would not have occurred. 
The position of the mine involved in the accident was part of a clear and obvious mine row, 
and was also consistent with the regular spacing of the mines.  This mine should therefore not 
have been unexpected, and with correct drills and due care should have been identified and 
removed safely. 
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Receiving notification of the mine accident in the MACC HQ in very short time is laudable, 
although as it turned out the casualty was not unconscious at anytime during the CASEVAC 
as was reported by [the Demining group].  The information given needs to be accurate as it 
could lead to unnecessary actions and further complicate and confuse the procedure. 
 
Recommendations 
The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
[The Demining group] amend their SOPs to state that when conducting prodding on a slope, 
all deminers must carry this out in the prone position, and ensure that the angle of the prodder 
remains at 30 degrees to the ground at all times. 
The correct wearing of personal protective equipment is to be strictly enforced by [the 
Demining group] management and supervisory staff. 
[The Demining group] management and supervisory staff are to re-emphasis to their 
deminers the need to maintain concentration and due care whilst conducting manual 
clearance drills. [The Demining group] team leaders are to be extra vigilant to ensure their 
deminers are conducting their clearance drills effectively and safely. 
[The Demining group] team leaders are to ensure deminers are made aware of identified 
patterns of mine rows and that necessary precautions and care is taken. 
[The Demining group] is to ensure the correct information is given when reporting mine 
accidents or incidents. 
 
ACCIDENT 30 SEP 01 
Conclusions 
Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
There was an uncontrolled detonation of a PMA3 anti-personnel mine on Sunday 30 
September 2001 in [the Demining group] minefield number 431 situated in the Kurvala region 
of Kosovo.  [The Victim] was in the process of removing a PMA3 mine when he knelt on 
another PMA3 that was missed by Deminer [name excised] (Deminer A). 
As a result of the uncontrolled detonation [the Victim] suffered very serious injury to his left leg 
and consequently the German KFOR doctors amputated the leg above the knee. 
Deminer A had located four PMA3 blast mines during his shift up until the time of the 
accident.  However he did not locate the PMA3 that [the Victim] knelt on and caused the 
accident.  The blast hole indicates that this mine was not laid at an excessive depth.  The 
mine that was missed was clearly within Deminer A’s area of responsibility for clearance and 
ought to have been located. 
Deminer T is not at fault for the cause of the accident as his area of responsibility for 
clearance was not part of the area where the mine was missed. 
 
Recommendations 
The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
[The Demining group] management takes the appropriate disciplinary action against Deminer 
A for this very serious breach of clearance standards that has caused this most unfortunate 
accident. 
[The Demining group] management and supervisory staff are to re-emphasis to their 
deminers the need to maintain concentration and due care whilst conducting manual 
clearance drills.  [The Demining group] team leaders are to be extra vigilant to ensure their 
deminers are conducting their clearance drills effectively and safely. 
10 
  
11 
